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Abstract
A recent approach based on Bayesian inverse planning for the
“theory of mind” has shown good performance in modeling
human cognition. However, perfect inverse planning differs
from human cognition during one kind of complex tasks due
to human bounded rationality. One example is an environment
in which there are many available plans for achieving a specific
goal. We propose a “plan predictability oriented model” as a
model of inferring other peoples’ goals in complex environ-
ments. This model adds the bias that people prefer predictable
plans. This bias is calculated with simple plan prediction. We
tested this model with a behavioral experiment in which hu-
mans observed the partial path of goal-directed actions. Our
model had a higher correlation with human inference. We also
confirmed the robustness of our model with complex tasks and
determined that it can be improved by taking account of indi-
vidual differences in “bounded rationality”.
Keywords: Bayesian Modeling; Theory of Mind; Hierarchical
Model; Bounded Rationality.
Introduction
People have a cognitive mechanism called the “theory of
mind” that can estimate peoples purposes and plans through
observation from infancy (Woodward, Sommerville, & Gua-
jardo, 2001). Trials for using this theory of mind as a com-
putational model are of great interest in the cognitive sci-
ence arena, and there has been a lot of research about this
(Goldman, 2012) (Paul & Cassimatis, 2006).
A recent approach based on Bayesian inverse planning has
been recognized as a method for modeling the theory of mind
(Baker, Saxe, & Tenenbaum, 2009). In this approach, peo-
ple are modeled as agents who are rational (Dennett, 1987).
When a goal is given, rational agents behave rationally to
achieve it. The posterior probability of a particular goal given
observed behavior is calculated by the product of the prior
probability of the goal and the likely behavior of the rational
agent given the goal.
This approach can be applied to all problems in which ra-
tional agents can be designed. There are many examples of
functions used to estimate other peoples’ intentions on the ba-
sis of this approach, such as other peoples’ intermediate goals
(Nakahashi, Baker, & Tenenbaum, 2016), preferences toward
navigation (Jara-ettinger, Schulz, & Tenenbaum, 2014), and
so on.
However, this approach may differ from human perception
in some complex situations.
(c) + + =
(a) Target = Green (b) Target = Orange??
Figure 1: Complex environment in which Bayesian inverse
planning is mistaken for model human inference. Bayesian
inverse planning infers green door as robots goal in (a), (b).
Humans may infer orange door in (b). (c) is rule for assem-
bling keys.
Figure 1 is one example of such a problem. In Figure 1 (a),
the robot wants to open and go through one of the doors. It
wants to go through either the orange door or the green door,
and the doors require a key of the same color to be opened. To
open a door, the robot assembles the required key. To do so, it
is necessary to collect three types of parts as shown in Figure
1 (c). In 1 (a), the robot moved as indicated by the purple
line. Which door is the robot about to open, the orange or
the green one? In this case, many people will answer with
the green one. This is because, if the robot wanted to open
the orange door, it would collect the three parts shown on the
upper half and open the orange door. How about the example
in 1 (b)? Perfectly rational thought leads to the conclusion
that the correct answer is green, as in 1 (a). The reason is that
there is a shorter path to collect the orange key parts than the
current robot path. For this reason, the inference formed on
the basis of the Bayesian inverse planning model will be that
the robot wants to go through the green door in this example.
However, we often infer that the robot wants to go through
the orange door when looking at Figure 1 (b).
This difference is due to the fact that observers cannot com-
pletely recognize the rationality of the actors when a problem
is complicated. In the above example, there are many possible
plans to achieve one goal, but it is difficult to evaluate all of
them. On the basis of this reason, human inference is affected
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by the bias towards “easy to predict” plans. This means that
humans only consider a few plans that can be easily predicted.
This is an example of bounded rationality (Simon, 1957).
In this paper, we propose a novel model called the “plan
predictability oriented model” for modeling human inference
with plan predictability bias. We aim to build a more adequate
model of human inference in problem settings in which there
are many plans available to achieve one goal, as shown in the
example. This model is based on Bayesian inverse planning,
but we allowed for bias in plan predictability in the inference
phase. We perform calculation with the likelihood of a future
plan from observed behavior like plan prediction (Charniak
& Goldman, 1993), and we use the likelihood as our plan
predictability bias. We use simple soft-max likelihood base
plan prediction.
To show the advantages of our proposed model, we de-
signed a scenario called “item creating” and carried out sub-
ject experiments with it. In this scenario, there is an agent
that collects parts to create a specific item. Participants ob-
serve part of the behavior of the agent and are then asked to
estimate the item that the agent wants to create on the basis
of the observation. We compared the correlation between this
participants data and both the inferences formed on the basis
of the full inverse planning model and our model. The re-
sult was that our model had a better correlation with human
inference than did the full inverse planning model. Addition-
ally, we confirmed that a higher task complexity made the
accuracy of the full inverse planning model worse, but our
model was not affected. We also show that there are individ-
ual differences regarding the bias and that we can improve
our model by considering individual differences.
We wrote a problem setting, detailed the full inverse plan-
ning model and plan predictability oriented model, wrote the
details and results of evaluations with the “item creating” sce-
nario, discussed and summarized our approach.
Computational Model
Preliminary
Notation and Problem Setting
We denote the set of people’s goals as G and the set of actions
as A . Action sequences are represented as a ∈ A+, and the
set of all plans to achieve goal g ∈ G are represented as Pg.
Since plans are a kind of sequence, Pg ⊂ A+.
Model of Human Rationality
We use Boltzmann noisy rationality as the rationality of ac-
tion for our model. In the definition for Boltzmann noisy ra-
tionality, P(a|g) is the probability that an agent executes a
for g in accordance with the Boltzmann distribution of the
“value” of a for achieving g. Equation 1 is the definition of
the probability. β is the temperature parameter of the Boltz-
mann distribution to define rationality.
P(g|a) = exp(βQg(a))
∑g′∈G exp(βQg′(a))
(1)
Here, Qg(a) corresponds to the value function in terms of
MDP planning or reinforcement learning which means ex-
pected rewards after executing a under g.
Modeling and Calculation
Problem Objective
The objective of our modeling is the posterior probability that
the goal of others is g when observing others action sequence
a.
P(g|a) (2)
Calculating Full Inverse Planning Model In the inverse
planning approach, we reverse the variable dependency in Eq.
2 by using a Bayesian theorem.
P(g|a) ∝ P(a|g)P(g) (3)
We assume no prior knowledge about another persons goal.
In other words, we assume P(g) as a uniform distribution.
Therefore, we can ignore P(g) from Eq. 3. To calculate this,
we assume that a human creates a plan in advance and exe-
cutes their actions according to the plan. Thus, we can factor-
ize P(a|g) into the probability of a plan to be considered as
one achieving g and the probability of executing a under the
plan. The following equation is obtained when summarizing
this factored probability for all available plans.
P(a|g) ∝ ∑
p∈Pg
P(a|p)P(p|g) (4)
P(a|p) and P(p|g) are calculated using Boltzmann noisy
rationality.
P(a|p) = exp(βQp,g(a))
∑p′∈Pg exp(βQp′,g(a))
P(p|g) = exp(βQg(p))
∑g′∈G exp(βQg′(p))
(5)
Note, that p is a plan for achieving a specific goal. In other
words, if a plan decided, the corresponding goal also comes
uniquely. Thus we can treat Qp,g(a) as Qp(a)
Calculating Plan Predictability Oriented Model In the
plan predictability oriented model, Eq. 3 is the same; how-
ever, the way of calculating of P(a|g) is made different in
order to integrate the bias that people prefer predicable plans.
The predictability of a plan is the probability that a plan is ex-
ecuting from observing action sequences, thus that is p(p|a).
We use this instead of P(a|p); thus, we obtain the following
equation.
P(a|g) ∝ ∑
p∈Pg
P(p|a)P(p|g) (6)
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Figure 2: Graphical model of P(a|g) for (a) full inverse plan-
ning model and (b) plan predictability oriented model.
Here, we use simple Boltzmann noisy rationality for
P(p|a) as follows.
P(p|a) = exp(βQp(a))
∑a∈A+ exp(βQp(a))
(7)
Comparison of Full Inverse Planning Model and Plan
Predictability Oriented Model Figure 2 shows the differ-
ence in graphical models for P(g|a). As shown Figure 2 (a),
in the full inverse planning model, humans assume that others
decide their plan in advance and then act according to it. This
is the natural process of human planning. In comparison, as
Figure 2 (b), in the plan predictability oriented model, action
sequence affect plans. This means that humans may change
their plans depending on their actions, and this is unintuitive.
We assume that humans cannot calculate the goals of others
on the basis of full inverse planning model because the model
needs all plans of Pg, and this is almost impossible for hu-
mans in complex situations. Humans consider several plans
to estimate others’ goal and they tend to consider plans that
they can predict easily. This is the reason that humans tend
to think that others take actions according to such unintuitive
process and this is plan predictability bias.
Discussion
Essentially, full inverse planning model differs from human
cognition in situations in which there is a difference in the
rationality of the actor and the observer. Since forward plan-
ning for taking action towards a particular goal is generally
easier than inverse planning to infer cause from actions ob-
served, these situations might always happen. Therefore, we
think that the model is useful for many situations. In addi-
tion, our computational model is based on the inverse plan-
ning model and simple plan prediction, so it has the potential
of being adapted to various situations. However, we showed
the actual effectiveness only under the “item creating” sce-
nario. This scenario is one example environment that has a
grid geometric rationality and sequential planning. Explicit
sequential planning is the most basic planning, and a lot of
human planning is based on sequential planning. The grid
geometric rationality and sequential planning are often used
in the theory of mind (Baker, Jara-Ettinger, Saxe, & Tenen-
baum, 2017). Therefore, we think that our model can be used
in broad situations.
Understanding how humans infer others’ intentions is use-
ful for considering good actions when corroborating with oth-
ers. In the cognitive science area, there is research on how
humans behave when they want to communicate their goal
or purpose (Shafto, Goodman, & Griffiths, 2014). In the ar-
tificial intelligence and robotics areas, research on collabo-
rative planning is more popular and important. For exam-
ple,“legibility” is proposed (Dragan & Srinivasa, 2014). This
is a measure of human expectation toward robots’ intentions
or goals as based on the behavior of robots. There are also
works on using “legibility” for planning (Fisac et al., 2017).
The expansion of our model for larger and more complex
tasks is a very interesting direction for our future work. In-
troducing hierarchical planning is a promising approach. Our
model can be considered as one type of hierarchical model-
ing in which the inference of plans is regarded as an inter-
mediate layer. The hierarchical predictive coding framework
(Blokpoel, Kwisthout, & van Rooij, 2012) is one example
of hierarchical modeling for human cognition. This model
has multiple inference layers with different abstraction levels,
and execute step-by-step inference by using MAP estimation.
Similarly, our model can be expanded with multiple planning
layers. Determining whether such a model is better for mod-
eling human cognition would be an interesting next research
step.
Deeper analysis of individual rationality is also interesting.
We just demonstrated that human rationality differs from per-
son to person. However, there might be some factors that de-
cide the degree of bias. Seeking such factors and improving
our model by implementing them would be a valuable study.
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a novel computational model
called the “plan predictability oriented model” to infer the
goals of others through their behavior. This model imple-
ments bounded rationality for complex tasks that have many
options for one purpose. We confirmed that our model has a
better correlation with human inference than the full inverse
planning model via a subject experiment using the item cre-
ating scenario. We also confirmed that the full inverse plan-
ning model becomes progressively worse with the increasing
complexity of tasks, while our model remains unaffected by
changes in complexity. This suggests that our model has ro-
bustness for complex tasks. We also confirmed the existence
of individual differences in bounded rationality and suggested
that we could improve our model by introducing individual-
ized bounded rationality.
Although there are many limitations and much room for
improvement, the model is valuable as one example of the
theory of mind with bounded rationality. We are confident
that this result can contribute to research on human cognition
and the development of engineering applications under cog-
nitive science.
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